Did the Texas A&M football team’s offensive performance versus Bowling Green decline?
During the first several weeks, this Texas A&M football squad has been rather mysterious, particularly on the offensive side of the ball. They appear a little more difficult to figure out than they otherwise might have, but the situation is more complicated than that.
Why are there so many problems now? The Aggies appeared to have everything under control against the Florida Gators, but now they are having trouble versus Bowling Green. The Falcons are decent, but are they really that good?
That is the question I am attempting to answer. Looking at the tape again with an eye on this Aggie team’s future, some intriguing findings can be found.
Texas A&M football’s offensive strategy is adaptable.
When Collin Klein was hired, one of the qualities we liked the most about him was his track record of adjusting his plan to fit the skills of his players. Despite the fact that some people are currently unhappy with Klein, I believe this assessment has come to pass.
Against Florida, we actually witnessed it at full tilt. In Weigman’s place, Marcel Reed deployed a ground-and-pound tactic against the Gators that proved to be quite successful. Granted, the fact that UF’s defense is poorly coached and sometimes unprepared helps, but the Aggies’ performance was nonetheless amazing.
However, those who follow the squad closely will notice that against Bowling Green, the offense had a slightly different appearance. Not entirely—many of the same ideas were present—but what the Aggies displayed against the Falcons was indicative of a different strategy employed by the coaching staff.
Two distinct methods
Allow me to explain by talking about the reverse. Lane Kiffin’s teams have utterly destroyed lower-level competition ever since he moved to Oxford. His teams appear to go out there with the intention of putting up as big of a number as possible by ruthlessly taking advantage of the other team’s flaws.
But, despite Kiffin’s teams appearing to be unbeatable against these inferior teams, it usually becomes clear halfway through the season that the Rebs are no more than a top-10 or top-15 team. Other teams, in the meantime, treat Ole Miss as though they were cupcakes themselves despite appearing less dominant against the cupcakes.
Let’s return to the Aggies now, though. Recall how the Cowboys eventually put together a lengthy drive against the Aggie third and fourth stringers to score against McNeese? How come Elko never used a timeout to insert the players who had been controlling McNeese during that period?
At that moment, I stated that this was indicative of Elko’s particular approach, which makes a lot of sense. Low on the Aggie depth chart, these men require snaps—action during the game. Elko then added them.
Despite A&M’s depth, McNeese found a way to succeed despite being a mediocre squad. Rather than halting play to maintain a shutout by substituting the starters or backups, Elko chose to give these depth players a chance to work things out on their own. Because sometimes you have to make quick decisions when playing a game!
Put differently, he saw it as an educational opportunity for these athletes. Given that the Ags were ahead by 52 points, it was as safe as a live game could get, yet it was still live.
While Kiffin and other coaches like him may consider games like Furman and Georgia Southern as an opportunity to put up large numbers, pad stats, and execute successful ideas over and time again, Elko and his staff view them as a lab. What aspects of game action do we still need to improve? Which notions need to be put to the test with real opponents?
Pushing the boundaries
This reminds us of the Bowling Green match. Since Conner Weigman is still out, Reed might have to start the game against Arkansas. Keeping that in mind, Klein and Elko decide to test Reed’s abilities with a marginally modified offensive strategy from the one he used against Florida.
They move it more downfield. They depend more on his arm. They remain motionless on the ground. All of this is a part of seeing how adaptable their QB2 can be and pushing his limitations. Should they continue using what we witnessed against Florida?
To be honest, I didn’t think the response was all that encouraging. The fact that Reed is unable to carry out this modified attacking strategy somewhat limits him. However, knowing now is preferable to trying to figure that out versus Arkansas.
That will still be difficult now. We might witness an entirely boring game if the Hogs start to regularly shut down the Aggie ground game. Additionally, I believe that this demonstrates why the A&M coaching staff selected Weigman right out of camp—his passing game prowess greatly increases the offensive team’s overall versatility.
However, take a peek at the two scripted drives Reed utilized. Both were touchdowns, and compared to most other sections of the game, both felt a lot easier. Reed did a really good job on both, and Klein had those in his pocket. Marcel needed to step outside of his comfort zone for the remainder of the game in order for the staff to assess their suitability for the signal caller role.
As I mentioned earlier, they might not be overly happy with the response. However, it’s critical to comprehend the strategy they were using.
